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Second Circuit Reverses Tax Court
By Chula G. Ensley
The U.S. Court of Appeals, Second 
Circuit, has recently held in Weissman 
v. Commissioner1 that, under some cir­
cumstances, a university professor is 
entitled to a home office deduction for 
the working area in his apartment used 
for university related activities. In so 
holding, the Second Circuit reversed 
a consistent Tax Court position that the 
principal place of business, i.e., focal 
point of the business activities, of a 
university professor as specified in 
Sec.280A(c)(1)(A) is the university 
campus. While the Weissman decision 
is relatively narrow in scope, many 
university professors may benefit 
therefrom.
Section 280A
Section 280A, enacted as part of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1976, generally dis­
allows a deduction for office space 
used within a dwelling unit which is the 
employee-taxpayer’s residence, 
unless specifically excepted from this 
section and otherwise allowable. An 
exception to this disallowance is found 
in Sec.280A(c) which provides that the 
employee-taxpayer shall not be denied 
a home office deduction if four condi­
tions are met. First, the use of the por­
tion of the dwelling unit serving as an 
office must be exclusive. Second, the 
use must be on a regular basis. Third, 
the portion of the dwelling unit under 
question must be the principal place of 
business of the taxpayer. Finally, such 
use must be for the convenience of the 
employer.
The legislative history of Section 
280A indicates that the exclusive use 
test requires that the taxpayer’s use of 
the portion of the dwelling unit be 
solely for the purpose of carrying on 
his trade or business. The Senate 
Report indicated that using a room in 
the house for both personal and busi­
ness purposes would not satisfy the 
exclusive use test.2 However, the Tax 
Court in Weightman v. Commissioner3 
found that a college professor who 
used a portion of his bedroom as a 
home office had satisfied the exclusive 
use test even though such portion was 
not physically separated from the rest 
of the bedroom. In so holding the Tax 
Court concluded that Sec.280A(c) 
does not require a separate room or 
some physically separated portion of 
a separate room. However, the Court 
indicated that without a wall, partition, 
curtain or some other means of iden­
tifying the business area, the taxpayer 
may have more difficulty establishing 
that there was in fact some separate, 
though unmarked, area that he used 
exclusively and on a regular basis as 
his home office.
In discussing the regular basis 
requirement, the Senate Report4 indi­
cated that a home office used only 
occasionally or incidentally would not 
be considered as used on a regular 
basis. The proposed regulations do lit­
tle to provide further guidance. Pro­
posed Regulation Sec.280A-2(h) merely 
states that the regular basis require­
ment is decided in light of all the facts 
and circumstances of the individual 
case. The scant authority, however, 
suggests that a taxpayer who estab­
lishes a consistent pattern of behavior 
in which the home office is an integral 
part of his business activities, will 
satisfy the regular basis requirement.
The principal place of business 
requirement looks to the “focal point’’ 
of the taxpayer’s business activities. 
The proposed regulations under 
Sec.280A provide that:
When a taxpayer engages in a sin­
gle trade or business at more than 
one location, it is necessary to deter­
mine the taxpayer’s principal place 
of business for that trade or business 
in light of all the facts and circum­
stances. Among the facts and cir­
cumstances to be taken into account 
in making this determination are the 
following:
(i) The portion of the total income 
from the business which is attrib­
utable to activities at each 
location;
(ii) The amount of time spent in 
activities related to that business 
at each location; and
(iii) The facilities available to the tax­
payer at each location for pur­
poses of that business.5
Neither the legislative history of 
Sec.280A, nor the proposed regula­
tions thereunder shed much light on 
the convenience of the employer 
requirement. The legislative history 
provides only that the deduction 
attributable to the home office use will 
be denied if such use is merely 
appropriate and helpful. The Fourth 
Circuit held in Bodzin6 that in order to 
establish that the use of the home 
office was for the convenience of the 
employer, the taxpayer must show that 
the office provided by the employer 
was either not available at the time the 
home office was used or not suitable 
for the purpose for which the home 
office was used.
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Weissman v. Commissioner
This case involves the question of 
deductibility of a home office main­
tained by David J. Weissman, an 
associate professor of philosophy at 
City College of the City of New York. 
Professor Weissman was required not 
only to teach, but also to conduct an 
unspecified amount of research and 
writing in his field in order to retain his 
teaching position. Of the 64 to 75 
hours per week Professor Weissman 
spent engaged in his profession, only 
14 to 15 hours per week or 20 percent 
was actually spent on campus. The 
remaining 80 percent of his working 
hours was spent in an office main­
tained in his ten-room apartment. The 
on campus office provided Professor 
Weissman by the university contained 
no typewriter, was shared with several 
other professors and was found by the 
Tax Court to be an unsafe place to 
leave his teaching, writing and 
research related materials and equip­
ment. Professor Weissman also had 
access to the school library from 9:00 
a.m. to 9:00 p.m. on weekdays. How­
ever, the library provided no space for 
typing manuscripts and no private 
space in which to work.
Based upon the facts in the case, 
the Tax Court accepted Weissman’s 
argument that the office in his apart­
ment was used exclusively and on a 
regular basis for his employment 
related activities of research and writ­
ing. However, the Tax Court denied 
Weissman’s argument that the home 
office was the focal point of his busi­
ness activities. In so concluding, the 
Tax Court stated that:
We have uniformly held that the focal 
point of those who teach (at both col­
lege and secondary school levels) is 
the educational institution rather than 
the home office. While research and 
writing was an important part of peti­
tioner’s duties as an associate 
professor, it does not shift the focal 
point of his job away from City Col­
lege where he taught, met with stu­
dents, graded examinations, and 
prepared lectures. This is so even 
though petitioner spent more time 
each week doing research and writ­
ing at home than he spent in teach­
ing and related activities at the 
college.7
The Tax Court denied Weissman’s 
argument that the maintenance of the 
home office was for the convenience 
of his employer. The Tax Court based 
this opinion first on the fact that the 
The Weissman decision 
permits a home office 
deduction for a University 
professor who is required to 
engage in research and 
writing, spends the majority of 
his working time doing so, 
and is not provided adequate 
on-campus office space for 
these activities.
university bylaws did not require the 
employee to maintain a home office 
and secondly on the basis of testimony 
of the assistant chairman of the philos­
ophy department that the library could 
have been used in some of Weiss­
man’s research.
The Second Circuit, however, 
rejected the Tax Court’s opinion that 
Weissman not be allowed the home 
office deduction because of failure to 
meet the principal place of business 
and convenience of employer tests.
In its opinion, the Second Circuit 
questioned the Tax Court’s focal point 
approach to determining a university 
professor’s principal place of business.
In the case of educators, the focal 
point approach does not always ade­
quately distinguish between 
individuals with very different 
employment activities. No doubt 
many college professors spend most 
of their working hours teaching or 
engaging in teaching-related activi­
ties .... Some college professors, 
however, spend the major share of 
their working hours researching and 
writing. Both types of employee have 
earned the designation of "profes­
sor,” but the title should not obscure 
the differences between them. In this 
case, the Tax Court focused too 
much on Professor Weissman’s title 
and too little on his activities.8
The Second Circuit cited Drucker v. 
Commissioner9 in which the Court 
used the following criteria to determine 
the principal place of business: (1) the 
nature of the business activities; (2) the 
facilities needed to carry out such 
activities; and (3) the practical neces­
sity of using a home office.
In applying Drucker to the instant 
case, the Second Circuit determined 
that the nature of Professor Weiss­
man’s business activities was 20 per­
cent teaching related and 80 percent 
research and writing related. The 
research and writing related activities 
required a place in which Professor 
Weissman could read, think and write 
without interruption. Since he was not 
provided a private on campus office in 
which to conduct the research and 
writing activities, a home office was a 
practical necessity. Thus, applying the 
Drucker case along with the fact that 
scholarly research and writing were 
conditions of Professor Weissman’s 
continued employment, the Second 
Circuit concluded that the principal 
place of business requirement was 
met. In so concluding, the Court added 
the following caveat:
In some circumstances the fact that 
a professor spends a majority of his 
working time in his home office will 
not overcome the presumption that 
an educator’s principal place of busi­
ness is the college at which he 
teaches.10
The Second Circuit likewise applied 
the Drucker case in reviewing the 
“convenience of the employer’’ 
requirement. In Drucker, the Court 
concluded that this requirement had 
been met because the appellants, who 
were musicians, had not been pro­
vided any space for the essential task 
of private practice, and because the 
expenses were not solely for personal 
convenience, comfort, or economy. 
Applying the Drucker standard, the 
Court concluded the following:
The cost of maintaining his home 
office was almost entirely additional 
to nondeductible personal living 
expenses because it was used exclu­
sively for employment-related activi­
ties and because such use was 
necessary as a practical matter if 
Professor Weissman was faithfully to 
perform his employment duties. This 
practical necessity negates any 
claim that the office was used as a 
matter of personal convenience 
rather than for the convenience of 
the employer. . . . The maintenance 
of a home office was not a personal 
preference of the employee; it 
spared the employer the cost of 
providing a suitable private office and 
thereby served the convenience of 
the employer.11
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Unresolved Issues
The Weissman case leaves three 
points unresolved: (1) Whether a lesser 
quantity, i.e., less than 80 percent, of 
working hours spent at the home office 
would satisfy the principal place of 
business requirement; (2) to what 
extent, if any, the professor could use 
the home office to engage in activities 
for which adequate on campus facili­
ties were provided, e.g., grading 
papers; and (3) whether the presence 
of all three factors of unsafe campus 
conditions, lack of private office space 
and lack of private library space were 
required to establish the necessity of 
a home office.
Application of Weissman
In General. The decision reached in 
Weissman would permit the home 
office deduction for a university profes­
sor who (1) by conditions of his 
employment, is required to engage in 
scholarly research and writing, (2) 
spends the majority of his working time 
engaged in scholarly research and 
writing, and (3) is not provided ade­
quate on campus office space in which 
to conduct scholarly research and 
writing.
A percentage of the following deduc­
tions is available to a professor who 
maintains a home office: (1) deprecia­
tion on the dwelling if the professor is 
a home owner, or the rental payment; 
(2) home mortgage interest; (3) real 
estate taxes; (4) insurance; (5) utilities; 
(6) alarm system; (7) telephone; (8) 
cleaning expense; and (9) some types 
of minor repairs. This percentage is 
generally based on the ratio of the 
square footage of the home office to 
the square footage of the total dwell­
ing. In addition, the following deduc­
tions not requiring allocation are 
available: (1) depreciation and invest­
ment tax credit on furnishings and 
equipment used in the home office; (2) 
supplies; (3) painting home office 
space; (4) office equipment repairs; (5) 
new curtains/drapes in space used as 
home office; (6) personal property 
taxes on office equipment, furnishings 
and equipment; and (7) other normal 
office operating expenses.
Under Sec.280F of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1984. Weissman may have 
special significance to a university 
professor when viewed within the con­
text of Sec.280F, added by the Tax 
Reform Act of 1984. Sec.280F gener­
ally denies an employee a deduction 
for and investment tax credit on cer­
tain “listed” properties used for trade 
or business purposes unless the use 
is both for the convenience of the 
employer and required as a condition 
of employment.12 Included in the defi­
nition of “listed” properties are com­
puters and peripheral equipment, and 
automobiles.
In most instances, a university 
professor would have difficulty under 
Sec.280F deducting the cost of a com­
puter and peripheral equipment used 
at home. However, Sec.280F(d)(4)(B) 
excludes from the definition of “listed” 
property any computer or peripheral 
equipment used exclusively at a regu­
lar business establishment. Such sec­
tion treats the home office as a regular 
business establishment if the require­
ments of Sec.280A(c)(1) are met. 
Therefore, a university professor who 
is able to substantiate a home office 
deduction under Sec.280A as outlined 
in Weissman should be allowed a 
depreciation deduction on and invest­
ment credit for a computer and 
peripheral equipment used therein.
Another significant deduction avail­
able to the professor who maintains a 
home office is the cost of commuting 
between the home office and campus. 
The Tax Court held in Curphey v. 
Commissioner13 that a taxpayer may 
deduct the transportation expenses 
incurred in traveling between his home
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and other business locations when the 
taxpayer’s home is his principal place 
of business with respect to those busi­
ness activities. While the university 
professor may or may not be denied 
a depreciation deduction and invest­
ment tax credit on his automobile 
under Sec.280F, he should be entitled 
to the standard mileage allowance for 
travel between his home office and the 
university campus if he qualifies for a 
home office deduction under 
Sec.280A(c)(1).
Substantiation of Home Office 
Deduction
The university professor who is eligi­
ble to take a home office deduction 
should have adequate records for sub­
stantiation thereof. These records 
should contain the following:
1. A statement by the employer recit­
ing scholarly research and writing 
as a condition of continued employ­
ment and promotion.
2. Documentation of on campus facil­
ities for carrying out scholarly 
research and writing to support 
both the necessity of having a 
home office and the convenience of 
the employer requirement.
3. Documentation of the working 
hours spent on campus and the 
working hours spent in the home 
office to support both the amount 
of time and the use of the time at 
both locations, to support the prin­
cipal place of business require­
ment, and to support the regular 
use requirement.
4. Documentation of the furnishings of 
the home office to support the 
deductions thereon and the exclu­
sive use requirement.
5. Documentation of all activities car­
ried out in the home office to sup­
port the exclusive use requirement.
6. Documentation to support the per­
centage used for allocating those 
deductions requiring allocation.
Conclusion
Prior to the Second Circuit’s deci­
sion in Weissman v. Commissioner, 
university professors were generally 
denied a home office deduction. Such 
denial typically resulted from the Tax 
Court’s finding that the principal place 
of business activity of a university 
professor is the university campus 
rather than the home office. Weissman 
more liberally applied this requirement
More on Page 18
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1981, $2.6 billion debt was resche­
duled; in 1985 it may reach or exceed 
$100 billion.
As long as the debtors can continue 
borrowing enough to pay interest on 
old loans, the merry-go-round con­
tinues. When debtors begin faltering, 
the recycling slows. Some worried cre­
ditors, usually the least exposed, stop 
throwing good money after bad. 
Others are too involved to cut their 
losses. If you owe the bank $1000 and 
cannot pay, it is your problem. If you 
owe the banks $300 billion and cannot 
pay, the banks are in trouble. Consider 
Citibank, for example. As the largest 
U.S. bank, it has capital of $5.5 billion. 
Citibank’s Brazilian loans alone 
amount to $4.4 billion. Manufacturers 
Hanover has $3.7 billion, 112 percent 
of its net worth, tied up in loans to Bra­
zil and Argentina. Chase Manhattan 
also has $3.6 billion, or 92 percent of 
its net worth, in loans to the same two 
countries. The nine largest U.S. banks 
together have $28 billion in capital, but 
$64 billion in loans outstanding to trou­
bled economies.1 One year of no 
interest or principal payments from 
Latin America would eliminate all 
profits and most capital of these U.S. 
banks. If Brazil, Argentina, and Mex­
ico decided to join forces and repudi­
ate their debts, the nine largest U.S. 
banks would be wiped out.
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Of course this will not happen. 
Governments, both of debt troubled 
countries and strong banking coun­
tries, cannot allow the massive col­
lapse of the international monetary 
system this situation portends. Efforts 
are being made by the International 
Monetary Fund, groups of debtor 
countries, and others to forestall each 
confrontation between bank and 
debtor country. The banks may come 
out in the end solely because they are 
too vital to let go under.
Whatever the ultimate resolution of 
the crisis, it is obvious that the 
accounting rules which allowed banks 
to postpone recognizing economic 
losses have had more negative than 
positive economic consequences. 
What would have happened given the 
necessity to write down restructured 
loans is impossible to reconstruct. But 
in retrospect it is easy to believe that 
the loan merry-go-round would have 
slowed more gradually, with time for 
the world economy to readjust, than 
face the present fear of total collapse. 
Conclusion
Standard setting for financial report­
ing is a complex process affected con­
currently by the need to serve 
numerous masters, maintain theoreti­
cal consistency, and accommodate the 
realities of the world economic struc­
ture. Ideally, financial reporting should
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measure and report behavior, not 
become the object of behavior. The 
accounting principle should not 
influence the economic decision, but 
merely report it. The troubled debt 
pronouncement is an unfortunate 
example where all the negative factors 
came into place at one time. The pri­
mary arguments against recognizing 
losses on restructuring were theoreti­
cal consistency and the potential 
effects on the economy. The resulting 
statement is a model for inconsistency, 
and has probably exacerbated the 
largest financial crisis in history. The 
FASB’s pronouncement provides 
heavy fuel for those parties who 
scorn the ability of business and 
the accounting profession to regulate 
themselves.Ω
NOTE
1Von Hoffman, Nicholas, The New Republic, 
October 14, 1985, pp. 21-22.
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by looking to the nature of the business 
activities, the attributes of the space in 
which the business activities can be 
carried out and the necessity of using 
a home office to carry out such 
activities.
While the Weissman decision is rela­
tively narrow in scope, many university 
professors may be able to apply their 
factual situations thereto in substan­
tiating a home office deduction.fi
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